A Unitary or Binary Model of Emotions: A Discussion on a Fundamental Difference between Cognitive Therapy and Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy by Hyland, Philip & Boduszek, Daniel
University of Huddersfield Repository
Hyland, Philip and Boduszek, Daniel
A Unitary or Binary Model of Emotions: A Discussion on a Fundamental Difference between 
Cognitive Therapy and Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy
Original Citation
Hyland, Philip and Boduszek, Daniel (2012) A Unitary or Binary Model of Emotions: A Discussion 
on a Fundamental Difference between Cognitive Therapy and Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy. 
Journal of Humanistics and Social Sciences , 1 (1). pp. 49-61. ISSN 2009-4612
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/15915/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
  
 
 
49 
 
 
 
A Unitary or Binary Model of Emotions: A 
Discussion on a Fundamental Difference 
between Cognitive Therapy and Rational 
Emotive Behaviour Therapy 
 
Philip Hyland & Daniel Boduszek 
University of Ulster, UK 
 
 
Abstract: The primary purpose of this paper is to consider the differential cognitive 
conceptualization of emotions postulated by the two main schools of cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT), namely Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Cognitive Therapy (CT).While CT 
theory favours a unitary model of emotional distress, REBT theory posits a binary model of 
emotional distress. This paper will address how the two approaches differ in their 
conceptualizations of emotional disturbance and the implications such differences have on clinical, 
theoretical, and research practice in both psychotherapy and psychology. A review of the relevant 
empirical literature will be presented with a recommendation for how future research can better 
investigate the differing predictions made by REBT and CT theory, respectively. 
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Introduction 
 As a mode of psychotherapy Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) has 
emerged from all others as the most empirically investigated and validated method 
of treating psychiatric and psychological disorders (Barlow, 2008; Butler, Forman, 
Chapman, & A. T. Beck, 2006; Chambless & Hollon, 1998; Chambless & Ollindick, 
2001; Engels, Garnefsky, & Diekstra, 1993; Epp & Dobson, 2010; Lyons & Woods, 
1991). The central theoretical precept of CBT, and from which it’s clinical practice 
emerges, is that all psychological disturbances occurs as a consequence of at least 
some form of dysfunctional cognitive information processing (A. T. Beck, 1976; 
Ellis, 1962, 1994). Complex emotional reactions are hypothesised to occur as a 
result of conscious or unconscious cognitive processing (David & Szentagotai, 
2006). Dysfunctional, irrational, or unrealistic processing of internal stimuli (e.g., a 
pain in the chest) or external stimuli (e.g., receiving a low grade on an exam) are 
hypothesised to produce unhealthy or maladaptive emotional reactions, while 
functional, rational, or realistic processing of such information will produce 
healthy and adaptive emotional reactions (J. S. Beck, 2011; David & Szentagotai, 
2006). This relationship between cognitions and emotions is among the most 
central of topics within not just psychotherapy but also cognitive psychology and 
psychological science as a whole. Cognitive Therapy (CT) and Rational Emotive 
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Behaviour Therapy (REBT) are the primary “CBT” approaches and given their 
respective conceptualizations of the importance of cognition in the development of 
emotions, they are both to be considered very much a part of the cognitive 
approach to emotions (see David & Cramer, 2010). The distinctions between CT’s 
and REBT’s models of emotion can be best understood with reference to well 
established cognitive models of emotions. 
 One of the earliest and most influential cognitive theories of emotions is the 
“Two-factor theory of emotions” (Schachter & Singer, 1962). The two-factor theory 
posits that emotional experience involves an interaction between physiological 
arousal and cognitive representation. Specifically, information received by the 
sense organs which is sent to sub-cortical regions of the brain triggers an 
autonomic response which is cognitively interpreted in relation to the situational 
context in order to label the arousal as fear, love, anger, joy, or some other emotion 
(Schachter, 1966). The two-factor theory (Schachter & Singer, 1962) posits that the 
important determining factor in the development of an emotional response is the 
way in which the individual represents a given situation in their cognitive system.  
 The two-factor theory of emotions (Schachter & Singer, 1962) explores the 
effects of representational cognitions on emotional experience. These 
representational cognitions include schemas, attributions, inferences, and 
automatic thoughts. These cognitions are congruent with what Abelson and 
Rosenberg (1958) refer to as “cold cognitions”. More recent cognitive theories of 
emotions have improved upon the two-factor theory by focusing on the role of “hot 
cognitions” (appraisal cognitions) as the primary causal cognitive mechanisms in 
the development of emotion. 
 The most prominent cognitive theory of emotion is the ‘Appraisal theory of 
emotions’ (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
Appraisal theory acknowledges the important role of cold cognitions in the 
development of emotions, as cold cognitions are viewed as the information that an 
individual subsequently evaluates in terms of the significance to one’s own 
personal interests. Appraisal theory states therefore that cold cognitions are a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of emotions. As long as 
cold cognitions go unevaluated they are insufficient to produce emotional 
reactions (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  
 According to Appraisal theory (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; 
Smith & Lazarus, 1993), emotion formation initially involves information 
processing to assess whether or not the present environmental situation is 
harmful, beneficial, threatening, or challenging, and an appraisal of one’s abilities 
to face or deal with this environment. This process of appraisal takes into account 
both the individual’s goals and their representation of the situation. So while the 
cognitive representation of a particular event has an influence on emotion 
formation, only the process of appraisal itself directly results in the development of 
emotional experience. In other words, the way in which a person appraises their 
representation of reality will determine their emotional response. 
 The appraisal process and the emotions which subsequently result then 
influence the way in which the individual copes with a particular environmental 
stimulus, thus a change in the person-environment context occurs. This altered 
person-environment context is then reappraised and this process of secondary 
appraisal leads to alterations in the nature and intensity of the emotional reaction. 
 Investigations into emotional development from a cognitive perspective 
have highlighted the importance not only of cognitive processes in general, but the 
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differential effect various types of cognitive processes have on emotions; the distal 
causes of attributions, inferences, and schemas (Schachter & Singer, 1962) and the 
proximate causes of evaluations and appraisals (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; 
Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Smith, et al, 1993). 
 
The CT and REBT Theories of Emotions 
 CT’s theory of psychopathology focuses on cognitive distortions expressed 
in automatic thoughts, inferences, attributions, rules, assumptions, and schemas (J. 
S. Beck, 2011; Leahy, 2003). These cognitive processes are consistent with Ableson 
and Rosenberg’s (1958) description of cold cognitions. These cognitive processes 
are ways of representing and/or interpreting the world in one’s cognitive system. 
CT theory posits that erroneous, negative, and/or maladaptive schemas give rise to 
distorted interpretations and representations of reality which in turn result in the 
development of emotional distress (A. T. Beck & Dozois, 2011; J. S. Beck, 2011; 
Leahy, 2003). Given its focus on dysfunctional cold cognitions in the development 
of emotional reactions, the theory and clinical practice of CT can therefore be said 
to be in line with the two-factor theory of emotions (Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
 Alternatively, REBT’s theory of psychopathology focuses on the role of 
irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1994). Irrational beliefs, as described by REBT theory, are 
evaluative or appraisal cognitive mechanisms, and hence are consistent with 
Ableson and Rosenberg’s (1958) description of hot cognitions. Rational and 
irrational beliefs are ways of appraising or evaluating particular representations of 
reality in terms of their personal significance to a particular individual. The theory 
of REBT posits that rigid, extreme, unrealistic, and illogical appraisals of our 
automatic interpretations give rise to emotional disturbances (Walen, DiGiuseppe, 
& Dryden, 1992; Ellis, 1994; Ellis & Dryden, 2007). Given REBT’s focus on hot 
cognitions as the primary causal cognitive mechanisms in the development of 
emotional reactions, the theory and clinical practice of REBT can therefore be said 
to be strongly congruent with the appraisal theory of emotions (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Such a distinction is 
extremely important because it indicates that the theory of emotions as described 
by REBT theory, as opposed to CT theory, is consistent with the most 
contemporary and empirically validated model of emotions in cognitive 
psychology (David, 2003). 
 
A Unitary Versus a Binary View of Emotions 
 Psychological science has predominately conceptualized emotions as a 
unitary entity (Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1999). However, the 
theory of REBT challenges this view and posits that emotional distress can be more 
accurately understood as a binary construct. The unitary model of emotional 
distress assumes that distress is experienced along a continuum which ranges 
from low levels of emotional distress to high levels of emotional distress, 
irrespective of the kind of emotion that is being measured, or whether one 
aggregates specific scores from various measures of discrete (negative) emotions 
into a score of general (negative) emotional distress (e.g. McNair, Lorr, & 
Droppleman, 1971). Currently within the psychological and CBT literature, the 
severity of emotional disturbance is considered to be a direct reflection of the 
intensity of the subjective level of negative emotional affect. If an individual 
experiences high levels of negative emotional affect such as high levels of sadness, 
anxiety, rage, irritation, shame, or regret, for example, that person is considered to 
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be emotionally disturbed, while a person who experiences low levels of such 
emotions is considered to be emotionally healthy. Psychological measures of mood, 
and of specific disorders, such as the Beck Depression Inventory II (A. T. Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the shortened version of the Profile of Mood States 
(Shacham, 1983) have been developed based on this view. Within this framework 
no distinction is made between various negative emotions which may be 
conceptualized as functional or dysfunctional; rather the functionality or 
dysfunctionality of the emotional experience is determined by the intensity with 
which any particular emotion is experienced.  
 David, Montgomery, Macavei, and Bovbjerg (2005a) point out that within a 
unitary framework of emotions different terms which are used to describe similar 
but apparently distinct emotional experiences, for example, concern as opposed to 
panic, or sadness as opposed to depression, could be considered from a number of 
perspectives. Firstly, labels such as concern or anxiety could be considered simply 
as synonyms: different labels describing an identical emotional experience. 
Secondly, such labels could describe differences in the intensity with which a 
person experiences the same underlying condition: concern represents low levels 
of anxiety whereas panic represents high levels of anxiety. Or thirdly, such labels 
could represent qualitatively different emotional responses: concern and panic are 
similar but distinct emotions, and their functionality depends upon the intensity 
with which each is experienced. According to this view, high levels of concern 
and/or high levels of panic would be considered unhealthy and dysfunctional 
while low levels of concern and/or low levels of panic would be considered 
functional and healthy. 
 Contrastingly, the binary model of emotional distress makes a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative distinction between functional and dysfunctional 
emotions. According to this view, an emotion such as panic is not merely “too 
much” concern, rather panic and concern are viewed as distinct emotions resulting 
from a radically different underlying cognitive architecture. In an important paper 
on the topic, Ellis and DiGiuseppe (1993) outlined in detail the REBT binary model 
of emotions, explaining that distinctions between functional and dysfunctional 
emotions (be they of a positive or a negative variety) cannot be made based upon 
arousal levels given that both functional and dysfunctional emotions can be 
experienced with low, medium, or high levels of intensity; that healthy and 
unhealthy emotions can be experienced simultaneously; that although emotions 
like rage or panic will usually produce maladaptive behavioural responses and are 
therefore usually considered “unhealthy”, under certain circumstances such 
emotions may in fact lead to adaptive behavioural responses and thus in unique 
circumstances emotions such as depression or anxiety can be considered “healthy” 
(a view which is congruent with an evolutionary perspective of human emotions - 
Pelusi, 2003); and that functional and dysfunctional emotions are largely the 
product of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. Furthermore, the binary 
model of emotions does not preclude the possibility that a person can experience 
both healthy and unhealthy emotions simultaneously. In other words, a person can 
experience both low, medium, or high levels of concern and low, medium, or high 
levels of anxiety about the same event.  
 An implication of the binary model within the clinical setting is that not all 
forms of negative affect would be targeted for intervention. A clinical intervention 
would target only unhealthy negative emotional experiences (feelings of 
worthlessness or panic) while recognising the beneficial nature of healthy negative 
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emotional experiences (feelings of concern or regret). The unitary model of 
emotions cannot make such a theoretical distinction between healthy and 
unhealthy emotions and thus any clinical intervention based upon the unitary 
framework would necessarily attempt to reduce all negative affect irrespective of 
its functionality; an approach which could well result in disadvantageous clinical 
outcomes.  
 
Quantitative or Qualitative Differences in Emotion: A Review of the Empirical 
Literature 
Cramer (1985) first attempted to test the REBT binary model of emotions with 
a series of correlational studies. These studies, which examined the relationship 
between irrational beliefs and functional and dysfunctional negative emotions, 
involved placing participants in either an imagined stressful situation or a non-
stressful situation. The results of Cramer’s (1985) study demonstrated a positive 
correlation between irrational beliefs and both functional and dysfunctional 
emotional reactions.  
 Cramer and Fong (1991) employed an experimental design in order to 
examine the relationship between irrational beliefs and functional and 
dysfunctional emotions. In this study, participants repeated either irrational or 
rational statements about a potentially unpleasant situation. Their hypothesis was 
that if functional and dysfunctional emotions differ quantitatively then those 
participants who repeated irrational statements should rate their functional and 
dysfunctional emotions as being more intense than those participants who 
repeated rational statements. If however functional and dysfunctional emotions 
differed qualitatively then it was hypothesised that participants repeating 
irrational statements should rate only their dysfunctional emotions as more 
intense than those participants repeating rational statements because irrational 
beliefs were hypothesised to influence only the dysfunctional emotions. The 
results of this study were congruent with Cramer’s (1985) earlier finding, 
revealing that rehearsal of irrational beliefs was associated with an increase in 
both functional and dysfunctional emotions leading Cramer and Fong (1991) to the 
conclusion that, “there was no support for the view that irrational beliefs evoke 
feelings which are qualitatively different from those produced by rational beliefs” (p. 
327). Furthermore, they concluded that their results “indicate that ‘inappropriate’ 
(dysfunctional) feelings are more suitably viewed as simply differing in intensity 
from ‘appropriate’ (functional) ones” (p. 327).  
 Cramer and Fong (1991) claimed that their research findings invalidated 
REBT’s binary model of emotions and their findings provided empirical support for 
the unitary model of emotions. Further studies by Cramer and Kupshik (1993), 
Cramer and Buckland (1996), and Cramer (2004, 2005) replicated these findings 
and provided additional weight to Cramer’s (1993) view that REBT’s original 
unitary model of emotional distress (Ellis & Harper, 1961; Ellis, 1962), which was 
wholly consistent with the current CT unitary model of emotions, is the more 
accurate model based upon the empirical evidence attained.  
 The findings of Cramer’s research group were not the only critique of 
REBT’s binary model of emotions. A philosophical critique from within the REBT 
community was articulated by Wessler (1996) who argued that the binary model 
of emotions is logically inconsistent. Wessler’s view rested on the arguments that it 
is impossible to feel both sad and depressed simultaneously; that mild feelings of 
depression or anxiety, for example, are considered dysfunctional by REBT theory; 
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that such conclusions are impossible to comprehend in clinical terms; and that no 
major theory of emotions endorses a binary view and therefore that the concept is 
pseudoscientific and REBT theory would do well to abandon it. Wessler also 
pointed to findings from Kassinove, Eckhardt, and Endes (1993) which showed 
that although people are easily able to identify quantitative differences in 
emotional experience, they find it extremely difficult to identify qualitative 
differences, suggesting to Wessler a major flaw in the binary model of emotions. 
 The evidence gathered by Cramer’s research group however is not an 
invalidation of REBT’s binary theory of emotions; in fact the evidence gathered by 
Cramer and his colleagues actually provides support for the predictions made by 
the binary model of emotions. The major flaw in the research program of Cramer 
and his colleagues is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the REBT theory of 
emotions actually predicts. This programme of research was based upon the 
hypothesis that if participants who rehearsed irrational statements showed 
increases in the intensity with which they rated both functional and dysfunctional 
emotions then the binary model would be invalidated and the unitary model would 
be supported. However, as detailed by Ellis and DiGiuseppe (1993) this is not at all 
what the REBT binary model of emotions proposes. Contrary to Cramer and Fong’s 
(1991) hypothesis, the REBT binary theory in fact predicts that individuals who 
hold irrational beliefs will show increased levels of both functional and 
dysfunctional emotions. Ellis and DiGiuseppe (1993) state: 
 
“...people who feel regretful and who also feel depressed and worthless start off 
with a preferential (or rational) Belief - such as “I don’t like my acting foolishly” – 
and then add a rigid, absolutist demand: “Therefore I have to do what I prefer, and 
if I don’t act sensibly, as I must, I cannot accept my self and must view myself as a 
really rotten person.” (Ellis & DiGiuseppe, 1993, p. 473). 
 
REBT theory states that at the core of neurotic disturbance is a process of 
escalating one’s rational, flexible preferences into irrational, rigid demands. 
Humans construct their unhealthy irrational beliefs from their healthy rational 
beliefs, in other words. Therefore, according to REBT theory it is to be expected 
that when a person possesses an irrational belief they will exhibit both functional 
and dysfunctional emotional responses since irrational beliefs tend to develop 
from rational ones, and consequently functional emotions are a component of 
dysfunctional emotions.  
 With respect to the criticisms of Wessler (1996), David, Schnur, and Belloiu 
(2002) point out that according to the appraisal theory of emotions (Lazarus, 
1991) the simultaneous coexistence between various types of negative emotions, 
whether they are functional or dysfunctional, as well as the simultaneous 
coexistence between positive and negative emotions, makes perfect sense. This can 
also be understood within the context of REBT theory. A person can have multiple 
goals when they encounter a specific activating event, about which they can have 
different beliefs and therefore experience multiple different emotional 
consequences. The variety of goals and the variety of beliefs an individual holds 
about the same event means the experience of different emotional reactions 
simultaneously is perfectly understandable. 
 Although Cramer’s research findings can be interpreted as support for 
REBT’s theory, when these findings are viewed in terms of what the binary model 
actually predicts, these findings should be interpreted cautiously given the 
  
Journal of Humanistics and Social Sciences, 2012, 1 (1), 49-61 
 
 
55 
 
methodology employed. Firstly, rehearsals of rational and irrational beliefs were 
used in these studies so there is no way of knowing whether or not participants 
actually internalised and believed these statements. Secondly, the vast majority of 
these studies employed imagined stressful situations, rather than remembered or 
real-life stressful events. Ellis (1994) has argued vigorously that a true test of the 
REBT theory should involve real-life stressful situations because rational and 
irrational beliefs are very often held implicitly until activated by a particular event, 
and would therefore only become accessible in the context of a real-life stressful 
activating event. Indeed there is now considerable evidence that this is in fact the 
case (Solomon, Arnow, Gotlib, & Wind, 2003; Szentagotai, David, Lupu, & Cosman, 
2008). 
 In order to more fully and accurately test the REBT binary model of 
emotions as outlined by Ellis and Harper (1975, 1997), Ellis and DiGiuseppe 
(1993), and Ellis (1994); David et al. (2002) tested the model within the 
framework of appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). This 
involved relating various concepts within the REBT model to the concepts of 
appraisal theory. Specifically, it was hypothesised that 
Demandingness/Preferences, which are the primary irrational and rational 
appraisal mechanisms in REBT theory, would be associated with the primary 
appraisal function in appraisal theory, while Awfulizing/Non-Awfulizing, Low 
Frustration Tolerance/High Frustration Tolerance, and Global 
Evaluations/Acceptance, which are the secondary irrational and rational appraisal 
mechanisms in REBT theory, would be significantly associated with the secondary 
appraisal mechanisms of appraisal theory. David et al.’s (2002) analysis did indeed 
support this hypothesis, validating a central component of Ellis’ (1994) REBT 
theory.  
 David et al.’s (2002) study also sought to investigate the relative 
contribution of appraisals and irrational beliefs relative to attributions in the 
development of emotions, specifically with respect to four emotion groups 
(concern/anxiety, sadness/depression, remorse/guilt, and annoyance/anger) 
which represented the distinction between the functional and dysfunctional 
emotions. In line with the predictions of appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Smith 
and Lazarus, 1993) and Ellis’ (1994) theory, results of this study showed that 
emotions were more significantly and directly related to appraisals and irrational 
beliefs then they were to attributions. 
 The results from this study also supported the REBT binary theory of 
emotions. While appraisals were directly related to emotions of both a functional 
and dysfunctional nature, irrational beliefs were related to dysfunctional emotions 
while functional emotions were associated with rational beliefs (measured as low 
levels of irrational beliefs). Functional emotions (concern, sadness, regret, and 
annoyance) were found to involve primary appraisals associated with Preferences 
while dysfunctional emotions (anxiety, depression, guilt, and anger) were found to 
involve primary appraisals associated with Demandingness. David et al. (2002) 
using regression analyses were able to increase the percentage of variance 
explained by appraisal theory (Smith et al. 1993) for each of the emotions studied 
by adding irrational beliefs to the analysis. Empirical evidence was therefore found 
which demonstrated that through the introduction of REBT’s theory of functional 
and dysfunctional emotions, the explanatory power of appraisal theory was 
significantly increased. 
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 The binary model was further supported by the finding that levels of 
arousal did not differentiate between functional and dysfunctional emotions. This 
supports Ellis’ (1994) hypothesis that the differentiating factor between functional 
and dysfunctional emotions is not a result of the intensity with which the emotion 
is experienced. 
 Due to criticisms that the results of the David et al. (2002) study were 
unreliable due to the use of a sample that consisted of psychology undergraduates 
who could have been aware of the theory under investigation, a replication of the 
study was conducted by David, David, Ghinea, Macavei, and Kallay (2005b) 
involving a sample of 120 physics undergraduate students and a sample of 60 
patients undergoing psychotherapy. Findings from this study replicated the 
original study from David et al. (2002), although some correlations while 
remaining significant did decrease. However, these findings from David et al. 
(2002) and David et al. (2005b) support the REBT theory that Demandingness is 
the primary irrational appraisal mechanism involved in various forms of 
psychopathology; that irrational beliefs being appraisal in nature are the 
proximate cognitive antecedents of emotions, and that irrational beliefs give rise to 
qualitatively different emotions than rational beliefs.  It can be argued based on the 
fact that David et al.’s (2002) initial findings in support of the REBT binary model 
of emotions were replicated in a clinical and non-clinical sample that these findings 
are both reliable and generalizable.  
 In order to further evaluate the robustness and generalizability of the 
binary theory of emotions, David, Schnur, and Birk (2004) tested Ellis’ (1994) 
cognitive theory of emotions within the framework of Schachter and Singer’s 
(1962) two-factor theory of emotions. As outlined previously in this chapter 
Schachter and Singer’s (1962) theory posits that emotion formation involves an 
interaction between cognitive and physiological factors. Specifically the theory 
states that during levels of high arousal individuals will give meaning to that 
arousal through cognitive interpretations of the environmental situation. However, 
the theory also states that when an obvious explanation for the physiological 
arousal is presented, no further explanatory search is conducted by the individual. 
 David et al. (2004) employed a quasi-experimental method in which 
undergraduate participants were primed with either rational or irrational beliefs. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to an exercise or no-exercise group. 
Participants then exercised or sat still and then either after a delay (the 
experimental group) or immediately following the exercise regime (the control 
group) the participants completed a rating of their emotional state.  
 The results supported both Schachter and Singer’s (1962) two-factor theory 
of emotions and Ellis’ (1994) cognitive theory of emotions. The participants in the 
experimental condition who did not have an obvious explanation for their 
continued arousal levels interpreted their arousal in line with their primed beliefs. 
Furthermore, those participants who were primed with rational beliefs interpreted 
their arousal with functional positive emotions (indicating the activating event was 
considered a positive one) while those who were primed with irrational beliefs 
interpreted their arousal with both functional and dysfunctional negative 
emotions; the functional negative emotions were combined with the dysfunctional 
ones (participants reported feeling sad and depressed, for example). Given that the 
unitary model of emotions states that arousal levels will differentiate functional 
from dysfunctional emotions, the findings of this study stand in contradiction with 
the predictions of the unitary model and support the binary model of emotions. 
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David et al.’s (2004) findings further demonstrated that arousal levels were not the 
differentiating variable between functional and dysfunctional emotions, rather 
rational and irrational beliefs were the differentiating causal variable between 
functional and dysfunctional emotions, supporting the binary model of emotions as 
predicted by REBT theory (Ellis & DiGiuseppe, 1993; Ellis, 1994). 
 The binary model of emotions was tested by David and colleagues (2005a) 
with respect to a third paradigm; the factorial paradigm. This followed the 
recommendation of Ellis and DiGiuseppe (1993) that the most appropriate test of 
the REBT cognitive theory of emotions would involve a principal component 
analysis (PCA). Specifically, Ellis and DiGiuseppe’s (1993) hypothesis was that if 
the REBT theory is correct then a PCA of the data should reveal two principal 
components. The first principal component should reveal that high levels of 
irrationality are positively correlated with both functional and dysfunctional 
negative emotions, while the second principal component should reveal that high 
levels of rationality are positively correlated with functional negative emotions 
and negatively correlated with dysfunctional negative emotions.  
 In order to maximise the ecological validity of the study David et al. (2005a) 
carried out two prospective studies involving 55 breast-cancer patients from the 
United States, and 45 breast-cancer patients from Romania, who were all about to 
undergo surgery related to their cancer. The results of both studies confirmed Ellis 
and DiGiuseppe’s (1993) hypothesis. Two principal components were extracted 
from the data which showed that during a real-life stressful event, high levels of 
irrational beliefs were associated with high levels of functional and dysfunctional 
negative emotions, while low levels of irrational beliefs (conceptualized as high 
levels of rational beliefs) were associated with high levels of functional negative 
emotions and low levels of dysfunctional negative emotions. Support for the REBT 
binary model was therefore found in two culturally distinct clinical samples. 
 Evidence supporting REBT’s cognitive theory of emotions (Ellis & 
DiGiuseppe, 1993; Ellis, 1994) has been established from other researchers too. 
Zisook, Shuchter, Irwin, Darko, Sledge, and Resovsky (1994) carried out a study 
investigating the immune functioning of recently widowed women compared to 
married women. Although no significant difference was found in immune 
functioning between the widowed sample and the non-widowed sample, within 
the widowed group itself significant differences were found between those women 
who met the diagnostic criteria for depression compared to those who did not. 
Widows who were experiencing depression, compared to widows who were 
experiencing grief (sadness), showed lower levels of NK cell activity and lower 
mitogen stimulation, revealing that depression, but not sadness, resulted in lower 
levels of immune functioning. 
 Harris, Davies, and Dryden (2006) experimentally tested a central 
hypothesis of REBT that irrational beliefs are at the core of psychological 
disturbance within the binary paradigm of emotions. The study involved a sample 
of 90 participants attending a General Practitioner’s office who had no history of 
mental illness. The participants were divided into three groups; a rational belief 
group, an irrational belief group, and an indifference belief group that served as a 
control group. Participants were then connected to a machine to monitor their 
blood pressure levels and told to sit as still as possible in front of a camera for 1 
minute and 10 “behavioural experts” would scrutinize their video, looking for tiny 
facial movements, and would then give each person a score out of 100 for stillness.  
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 The results of the experiment showed that participants in the irrational 
belief group experienced increased levels of anxiety (with corresponding increases 
in systolic blood pressure), while those in the rational belief group experienced 
increases in their levels of concern, but not anxiety (and a corresponding decrease 
in systolic blood pressure). Harris et al.’s (2006) study provides experimental 
support for REBT’s binary model of emotion.  
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
 This review of the empirical literature which has tested the predictions of 
the unitary and binary models of emotions has provided considerably strong and 
robust support in favour of a binary rather than a unitary view of emotional 
distress. The binary model advanced by REBT theory has been supported within 
the framework of three separate cognitive paradigms, in multiple clinical and non-
clinical samples from distinct cultural backgrounds, and within the context of a 
true experimental design. However, there is a significant limitation with the 
majority of these studies which needs consideration. In most of these studies high 
levels of rational beliefs were measured as low scores on a measure of irrational 
beliefs. The assumption that low levels of irrational beliefs signify the presence of 
high levels of rational beliefs may well be an erroneous one. Research has 
suggested that rational and irrational beliefs are by no means polar opposites of 
each other (Bernard, 1998; DiGiuseppe, Robin, Leaf, & Gorman, 1989) therefore 
this research, strong and supportive as it is, should be interpreted with this 
limitation in mind. 
 Despite the evidence obtained in support of the binary model of emotions, it 
would be premature and inaccurate to argue that the binary model should be 
considered superior to the much more widely accepted unitary model. Far more 
empirical data is required before any conclusion regarding which model should be 
favoured can be drawn. Finding an answer to this question is however extremely 
important as the implications of such an answer would have far reaching 
consequences in both the theoretical and clinical domains. We propose that a 
significant contribution will be made by overcoming some of the methodological 
limitations of previous research endeavours. We suggest that researchers should 
employ an alternative and more stringent statistical-methodological approach to 
investigate Ellis and DiGiuseppe’s (1993) recommendation for how to best test the 
competing predictions of the unitary and binary models. Rather than utilizing 
principal component analysis, the use of confirmatory factor analysis would 
provide a much more robust method of investigating the differential theoretical 
predictions. Additionally, rather than conceptualizing high levels of rational beliefs 
from a low score on a measure of irrational beliefs, a practice that previous studies 
have employed which appears to founded on a false assumption (see Bernard, 
1998), future investigators should use a measure of both rational and irrational 
beliefs in order to more accurately determine whether the predictions of REBT 
regarding a binary view of emotions is valid. Given the serious clinical implications 
that would arise from support for the binary model, it is essential that such 
research be carried out.  
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